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A TAle of Two ProTocols: MonTreAl And 
KyoTo 
The Montreal Protocol
The 1987 Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer was a pivotal agreement in the 
history of global environmental negotiations. It established a 
process that remains an important precedent for dealing with 
global  environmental  problems,  including  global  warming. 
What made the negotiation of that agreement such an iconic 
event, and what useful lessons does it hold for climate change 
negotiators?
The  Montreal  Protocol  and  its  amendments  addressed 
the challenge of a deteriorating stratospheric ozone layer that 
threatened to expose life on earth to greatly increased and 
damaging levels of ultraviolet radiation. The protocol initially 
called for a 50 percent reduction by 1999 in the production of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which had been identified as the 
principal cause of ozone layer deterioration. The agreement 
also set up a procedure for regularly reviewing and revising its 
provisions at subsequent Conferences of the Parties (COPs). 
These  “review  and  revise”  meetings  led  over  the  following 
decade to amendments that broadened the scope of controlled 
ozone-depleting  substances  and  set  earlier  dates  for  fully 
phasing  them  out.  The  parties  also  established  a  Montreal 
Protocol  Fund  to  assist  developing  countries  with  meeting 
their obligations under the protocol.
Several factors were critical to the success of the Montreal 
Protocol.  The  first  was  the  leadership  role  played  by  the 
United States from the beginning, well before the start of 
negotiations on the protocol. The United States was among 
the first to recognize the threat that CFCs posed to the strato-
spheric  ozone  layer.  The  United  States,  along  with  several 
Nordic countries, took early action to counter that threat to 
humans and other life on Earth by banning the use of CFCs 
in most aerosols.
Secretary of State George Shultz named a chief negotiator, 
Richard Benedick, in the summer of 1986, more than a year 
before the Montreal Protocol was concluded in September 
1987. As a result, Benedick, an experienced foreign service 
officer, had ample time to shepherd the development of the 
US position through a contentious interagency process, which 
he also headed. 
During that prenegotiation period, he had a construc-
tive dialogue with the affected domestic industries, Congress, 
environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 
his foreign counterparts. For example, Benedick, with strong 
support from the Environmental Protection Agency, used an 
offsite workshop in Leesburg, Virginia, to persuade skeptical 
representatives of concerned industries that the threat to the 
ozone layer was real and to gain their acceptance of pursuing 
an international agreement to deal with it. 
Because  the  preparatory  work  was  so  thorough,  the 
United  States  entered  international  talks  on  the  Montreal 
Protocol with a coherent and well thought out negotiating 
strategy that had significant support among domestic stake-
holders. US negotiators also had broad support in Congress. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 1   A u g u s t   2 0 1 0
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Then-senators Al Gore and Tim Wirth were leaders in urging 
action to save the ozone layer.
Perhaps the greatest strength of the Montreal Protocol has 
been its built-in flexibility in accommodating new informa-
tion rapidly and efficiently. The parties established panels on 
science, environment, technology, and economics, and they 
committed themselves to periodically reconsider the operative 
provisions of the agreement, taking into account the work of 
those panels. For example, a synthesis report incorporating 
findings of these panels formed the basis of the negotiation 
of amendments and adjustments to the protocol that were 
adopted  at  the  London  COP  in  June  1990.  This  report 
summarized a peer-reviewed process that involved the work of 
more than 500 scientists and other experts.
At  the  London  COP  the  parties  also  established  the 
Montreal  Protocol  Fund  to  assist  developing  countries  in 
transitioning  away  from  CFCs  and  other  ozone-depleting 
chemicals. This fund operates under an executive committee 
based in Montreal that was established by the parties to the 
protocol and reports to them at their periodic conferences. The 
membership of the committee consists of seven developed and 
seven developing countries. The participants in the London 
meeting estimated that a fund of slightly over $200 million 
would be needed in the initial years of the transition, and the 
US share, based on a UN assessment formula, would be 25 
percent of that amount. During 1991–2005, total pledges to 
the fund amounted to $2.1 billion. The creation of the fund 
was critical in persuading major developing countries, particu-
larly India and China, to become parties to the protocol. 
At the London COP and subsequent conferences, which 
followed  every  couple  of  years,  additional  ozone-depleting 
chemicals, such as methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride, 
were identified and added to the list of controlled substances. 
Also, the time for bringing down the production and use of 
controlled substances—originally set for a 50 percent reduc-
tion  by  mid-1999  (2009  for  developing  countries)—was 
substantially shortened, and the total reduction was increased 
to a full phaseout. This “review and revise” approach has been 
an essential element in the protocol’s ability to make progress 
in achieving its goal of saving the stratospheric ozone layer.
Another critical factor was that from the outset all coun-
tries that were parties to the agreement made commitments to 
reduce the production and use of ozone-depleting substances.1 
The developing countries were given an additional ten years to 
meet those commitments, but there was no invidious distinc-
tion  between  some  countries’  undertakings  being  voluntary, 
while others were making mandatory commitments. As a result, 
the tension between developing and developed countries was 
minimized.  A  negotiating  climate  was  created  in  which  the 
threat to the ozone layer was seen as a challenge to all, requiring 
every party to contribute to resolving the problem.
The negotiators of the Montreal Protocol faced the same 
argument from developing countries that climate change nego-
tiators are encountering: Why shouldn’t developing countries 
have the same opportunities for development using CFCs or 
carbon-emitting fuels that developed countries had? If not, 
shouldn’t developed countries, which caused the problem, pay 
the cost of the transition to a more sustainable development 
path? The establishment of the Montreal Protocol Fund and 
the provision of a longer timeframe for meeting their commit-
ments were essential elements in responding to this argument 
and overcoming developing-country reluctance to participate.
The Kyoto Protocol
The negotiation of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
handled differently and resulted in a much less satisfactory 
agreement. The chief US negotiator, Undersecretary of State 
Stuart Eizenstat, was not named until a couple of months 
before the meeting in Kyoto. There was no time for adequate 
interagency  preparation  for  the  meeting  or  for  sufficient 
consultation  with  domestic  stakeholders  or  with  Congress. 
The US delegation arrived in Kyoto without clear guidance on 
what, if any, reduction in US carbon emissions it could accept.
The  carbon  emissions  reduction  commitments  in  the 
protocol  were  negotiated  in  Kyoto  among  the  representa-
tives of the developed countries. These commitments, which 
differed from country to country, were made more on the 
basis of political bargaining than on an evaluation of what 
would be required to deal effectively with the threat of global 
warming. Nor did these commitments adequately take into 
account the ability of all of the countries involved to carry out 
those undertakings. The European Union, for example, could 
offset likely shortfalls by some member states with anticipated 
overcompliance by others in order to meet an overall goal for 
carbon emissions reductions. In the case of Russia, its post-
Soviet economic collapse in the 1990s had already reduced 
1. Some significant users of CFCs, such as India and China, did not become 
parties until 1990, when the Montreal Protocol Fund was established.
Climate change negotiators would be well 
advised to reflect on the Montreal Protocol 
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its carbon emissions to a point where overcompliance with 
its  targeted  emissions  reductions  was  assured.  Others,  like 
the United States and Canada, which had greatly increased 
their carbon emissions since 1990, had little or no prospect of 
achieving the emissions reductions that would be necessary for 
them to meet their targets under the protocol.
The  protocol  included  no  specific  commitments  by 
developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Six 
months before the meeting, in July 1997, the US Senate had 
put down a marker in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, passed by a 
vote of 95-0, that any agreement without such commitments 
by developing countries would be unacceptable. Therefore, it 
was clear from the time the deal was struck that there was 
virtually no chance that the United States would ratify the 
agreement and become a party to the protocol.
coPenhAgen Accord
At the UNFCCC Conference of Parties held in Copenhagen 
in December 2009, climate change negotiators avoided the 
worst  result:  another  Kyoto-like  agreement  to  unrealistic, 
politically determined, “mandatory” carbon emissions reduc-
tion commitments undertaken only by developed countries. 
Rather, the Copenhagen Accord, which was brokered in the 
closing hours of a chaotic meeting, with the direct involve-
ment  of  President  Barack  Obama,  moved  away  from  the 
approach of the discredited Kyoto Protocol. Many observers 
have  expressed  disappointment  with  this  result,  but  I  am 
convinced that it has put us on a much more promising track. 
The countries that account for the vast majority of the 
world’s  carbon  emissions  were  included  in  the  agreement 
to develop their own plans for controlling those emissions. 
Importantly,  they  agreed  that  those  plans  would  be  trans-
parent and that they would be subject to review by the other 
parties to the agreement. For the first time, both developed 
countries and the major emerging economies, including India 
and China, joined together in a commitment to deal with 
global warming in a serious and sustained way.
The  emissions  reduction  plans  envisioned  under  the 
Copenhagen  Accord  would  not  be  legally  binding,  which 
bothers  some  people.  These  plans  will,  however,  represent 
strong political commitments, and the countries that make 
them can be expected to exert every effort to avoid falling 
short on such commitments. I believe that an insistence on 
the need for so-called mandatory agreements is misplaced. 
Environmental agreements have withdrawal provisions, 
and countries that are pressed to take actions they believe 
are not in their interest have an option to use these provi-
sions. The effectiveness of trade sanctions and other punitive 
measures to enforce compliance is questionable and, in any 
case, would in my view be nonnegotiable as part of a climate 
change agreement.2 
It is also important that the signers of the Copenhagen 
Accord  agreed  to  a  common  goal  of  keeping  the  global 
temperature  increase  to  less  than  2  degrees  Celsius.  What 
they are prepared to do initially may not be enough, but they 
are  committed  to  taking  significant  first  steps  in  the  right 
direction.3 
lessons froM The MonTreAl ProTocol 
for cliMATe chAnge negoTiATors
The negotiators of the Montreal Protocol faced formidable 
difficulties in dealing with a problem whose effects, while not 
immediate, were likely to be catastrophic over time in a “busi-
ness as usual” scenario and whose solution would impose great 
transitional costs. Also, as is the case with climate change, 
they had to deal with some degree of scientific uncertainty. In 
fact, at the time that the Montreal Protocol was negotiated, 
the  evidence  for  anthropogenic  ozone  layer  depletion  was, 
if anything, less compelling than the current case for global 
warming. 
Clearly, climate change negotiators face a more complex 
and far-reaching challenge. The phaseout of ozone-depleting 
2. The Montreal Protocol contains a provision prohibiting trade in controlled 
substances with nonparties that are not taking comparable steps to limit 
emissions of those substances, but it does not include trade sanctions aimed at 
enforcing compliance by parties to the protocol. The existence of this provi-
sion may or may not have acted as a deterrent to nonparties, but it has never 
been invoked.
3. As of March 2, 2010, the United Nations listed 106 countries, account-
ing for 81 percent of global carbon emissions, as having signed up to the 
Copenhagen Accord, and 72 of them have submitted specific national emis-
sions reduction plans. See Trevor Houser, Copenhagen, the Accord, and the Way 
Forward, Policy Briefs in International Economics 10-5 (Washington: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, March 2010, 11). 
Once it has been established on a 
worldwide basis that carbon emissions 
come at a cost, and that the cost will 
be increasing, the world will be on a 
path to a much less carbon-intensive 
future and will have begun to address 
global warming in a meaningful way.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 1   A u g u s t   2 0 1 0
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chemicals and related infrastructure involved major industries 
such as refrigeration, electronics, fire fighting, and aerosols and 
cost billions of dollars. But dealing with global warming will 
require fundamentally rethinking our carbon-based societies and 
taking steps that will affect virtually every aspect of economic 
activity. Despite this significant difference in the impact on the 
economic structure of the countries concerned, however, there 
are similarities between the two challenges, and climate change 
negotiators would be well advised to reflect on the Montreal 
Protocol and the lessons that can be learned from it.
In that regard, it is encouraging that the Obama admin-
istration  moved  early  to  name  a  capable  and  experienced 
chief  negotiator,  Todd  Stern,  who  can  assert  US  leader-
ship and ensure that the United States enters future climate 
change negotiations with a clear negotiating strategy that has 
adequate support domestically. It usually does not work for a 
US administration to lead the development of domestic policy 
through international negotiations, as was tried in the case of 
the Kyoto Protocol.
As with the Montreal Protocol, we need to reach an agree-
ment on climate change that creates a process that would move 
us to a desired result. Only 24 countries and the European 
Commission  signed  the  Montreal  Protocol  in  September 
1987. These initial signatories to the Montreal Protocol did 
include virtually all the developed countries, which accounted 
for the vast majority of global production of CFCs. However, 
they did not include many of the major developing countries 
with rapidly emerging economies, such as India and China. 
Although  it  is  important  to  bring  the  emerging-economy 
countries into such global agreements without undue delay, a 
lesson for climate change negotiators is that everyone does not 
need to be on board in the first instance in order for a global 
agreement to ultimately achieve its goals. 
The provisions of the Montreal Protocol for reducing the 
production and use of ozone-depleting substances, as negotiated 
in 1987, did not go nearly far enough. It was only after repeatedly 
returning to the table over the following decade to reconsider 
those provisions, taking into account developments in science 
and other new information, that the parties were able to do what 
was necessary to begin to arrest and eventually reverse the dete-
rioration of the ozone layer. During that period, the parties to 
the protocol increased by several times over the original number 
of signatories. The Montreal Protocol now has over 190 parties 
and includes all the members of the United Nations. 
Because of the extremely long persistence of CFCs in the 
atmosphere, it is estimated that it may take until about 2070 
for the ozone layer to be fully restored and for the seasonal 
ozone  hole  over  the  Antarctic  to  be  repaired.  However, 
commitments under the protocol for ending the production 
of CFCs and other ozone-depleting chemicals have been met 
or exceeded, and some rebuilding of the stratospheric ozone 
layer has been detected.
Thus, it was the process that the Montreal Protocol set 
in motion—not the initial commitments to reduce the use 
of  ozone-depleting  chemicals  in  the  agreement  itself—that 
enabled us to achieve this remarkably successful result. This is 
one of the central lessons that climate change negotiators can 
learn from the Montreal Protocol. 
We won’t get it right the first time. However, we do need 
to get started, with all parties to an agreement, developed and 
developing alike, making specific contributions to the effort 
to limit carbon emissions. Once it has been established on 
a worldwide basis that carbon emissions come at a cost, and 
that the cost will be increasing, the world will be on a path to 
a much less carbon-intensive future and will have begun to 
address global warming in a meaningful way.
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